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NECESSARY AND SUFFICIENT CONDITION FOR
EQUILIBRIUM OF THE HOTELLING MODEL ON A CIRCLE
SATOSHI HAYASHI† AND NAOKI TSUGE‡
Abstract. We are concerned with a model of vendors competing to sell a
homogeneous product to customers spread evenly along a circular city. This
model is based on Hotelling’s celebrated paper in 1929. Our aim in this pa-
per is to show a necessary and sufficient condition for the equilibrium, which
describes geometric properties of the equilibrium. To achieve this, we first
formulate the model mathematically. Next, we prove that the condition holds
if and only if vendors are equilibrium.
1. Introduction
We study a model in which a circular city lies on a circle with circumference
length 1 and customers are uniformly distributed with density 1 along this circle.
We consider n vendors moving on this circle. The model governs a competition
between vendors on a simple closed curve. Let the location of the vendor k (k =
1, 2, 3, . . . , n) be xk ∈ [0, 1]. We assume that x1 ≤ x2 ≤ · · · ≤ xn and denote the
location of n vendors (x1, x2, x3, . . . , xn) by x. Since we study the competition
between vendors, we consider n ≥ 2 in particular. The price of one unit of product
for each vendor is identical. Moreover, we assume the following.
If there exist l (l = 1, 2, 3, . . . , n) vendors nearest to a customer, the customer
purchases 1/l unit of product per unit of time from each of the l vendors respectively.
Every vendor then seeks a location to maximize his profit.
We then represent the profit of vendor k per unit of time by a mathematical
notation. We first denote a distance on the circle between x, y ∈ [0, 1] by d(x, y) =
min{|x− y + 1|, |x− y|, |x− y − 1|}.
Remark 1.1. We regard x, y ∈ [0, 1] as points on a circle with circumference length
1. Then d(x, y) represents the length of bold-faced arcs in the following figure.
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That is, d(x, y) is the shortest distance between x and y on the circle.
Given a vector ξ = (ξ1, ξ2, . . . , ξn) ∈ [0, 1]
n and 0 ≤ y ≤ 1, we then define a set
S(ξ, y) = {j ∈ {1, 2, 3, . . . , n} : d(ξj , y) = min
i
d(ξi, y)}. By using a density function
ρk(ξ, y) =


0 if d(ξk, y) > min
i
d(ξi, y)
1
|S(ξ, y)|
if d(ξk, y) = min
i
d(ξi, y)
,
we define
fk(ξ) =
∫ 1
0
ρk(ξ, y)dy,
where |S(ξ, y)| represents a number of elements in a set S(ξ, y). We call fk(x) the
profit of vendor k per unit of time for a location x. We then define equilibrium as
follows.
Definition 1.1. A location x∗ = (x∗1, x
∗
2, x
∗
3, . . . , x
∗
n) ∈ [0, 1]
n is called equilibrium,
if
fk(x
∗) ≥ fk(x
∗
1, x
∗
2, x
∗
3, . . . , x
∗
k−1, xk, x
∗
k+1, . . . , x
∗
n)
holds for any k ∈ {1, 2, 3, . . . , n} and xk ∈ [0, 1].
We review the known results. The present model is based on the Hotelling’s
pioneer work [3]. Although we consider the circle as a product space, Hotelling
dealed with a finite line. In [2], authors show a necessary and sufficient condition
for the equilibrium of n vendors on the line.
On the other hand, our model was introduced by Eaton and Lipsey [1], who
discussed with the existence of equilibrium for the model without the price. Subse-
quently, taking the price into account, Salop [4] studied the model for two vendors.
In this paper, we are concerned with n vendors on the circle and investigate their
equilibrium. Our goal is to present a necessary and sufficient condition for the
equilibrium.
For convenience, we set x1 = 0, x0 = xn, x−1 = xn−1, x−2 = xn−2, xn+1 =
x1, xn+2 = x2 and denote a interval [xk, xk+1] by Ik (k = −2,−1, 0, 1, . . . , n+ 1).
Then our main theorem is as follows.
Theorem 1.1.
x is equilibrium, if and only if the following condition (1.1) hold.
We define a set |I¯| = max
l∈{1,2,··· ,n}
|Il|.
|Ik|+ |Ik+1| ≥ |I¯| (1 ≤ k ≤ n), (1.1)
where |I| represents the length of an interval I.
Remark 1.2. From (1.1), we notice that any location becomes equilibrium for n =
2. On the other hand, we find that equilibrium for n = 3 is x∗ =
(
0,
1
2
,
1
2
)
,
(
0, 0,
1
2
)
.
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2. Preliminary
In this section, we prepare some lemmas and a proposition to prove our main
theorem in a next section. We first consider the profit of i vendors which locate at
one point. We have the following lemma.
Lemma 2.1. We consider a location x = (x1, x2, x3, . . . , xn) with 0 = x1 ≤ x2 ≤
x3 ≤ · · · ≤ xn. We assume that xl < xl+1 = · · · = xk = · · · = xl+i < xl+i+1 (n ≥
2, l ≥ 0, l + i+ 1 ≤ n+ 1, 1 ≤ i ≤ n).
fk(x) =
1
2i
(|Il|+ |Il+i|).
Proof.
0(= 1)
xl
xk
xl+i+1...
ivendors
We have fk(x) =
1
i
(
1
2
|Il|+
1
2
|Il+i|
)
=
1
2i
(|Il|+ |Il+i|).

Next, the following proposition play an important role.
Proposition 2.2. If the location of n vendors x = (x1, x2, x3, . . . , xn) with 0 =
x1 ≤ x2 ≤ x3 ≤ · · · ≤ xn (n ≥ 2) is equilibrium, the following holds.
No more than 2 vendors can occupy a location. (2.1)
Proof.
We prove that x is not equilibrium, provided that i (3 ≤ i ≤ n) vendors occupy
at a point. We assume that xl < xl+1 = · · · = xk = · · · = xl+i < xl+i+1 (l ≥
0, l + i + 1 ≤ n + 1, 3 ≤ i ≤ n). Therefore there exist xl and xl+i+1 at least
one respectively. We notice that xl < xk < xl+i+1 and there exists no vendor on
(xl, xk) and (xk, xl+i+1).
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0(= 1)
xl
xk
xl+i+1...
ivendors
If |Il| ≥ |Il+i|, we notice that fk(x) =
1
2i
(|Il|+ |Il+i|) ≤
1
6
(|Il|+ |Il+i|) ≤
1
6
(|Il|+
|Il|) =
1
3
|Il|. Setting x
′
k ∈ (xl, xl+1), we have fk(x1, · · · , xk−1, x
′
k, xk+1, · · · , xn) =
1
2
(|[xl, x
′
k]|+ |[x
′
k, xk]|) =
1
2
|Il| > fk(x).
For the other case |Il| < |Il+i|, from the symmetry, we can similarly show that
there exists x′k such that fk(x1, · · · , xk−1, x
′
k, xk+1, · · · , xn) > fk(x).
We can complete the proof of (2.1). 
Finally, we compare a location after the movement of a vendor with the original
one. To do this, we introduce the following notation.
For a given location of n vendors x = (x1, x2, x3, . . . , xn) with (0 =) x1 ≤ x2 ≤
· · · ≤ xn, we move vendor k from xk to any fixed point in A ⊂ [0, 1]. We denote
the resultant location by xk → A. We notice that xk → A represents the following
vector
(x1, x2, , . . . , xk−1, x
′
k, xk+1, . . . , xn),
where x′k is a location of vendor k after movement and x
′
k ∈ A.
3. Proof of Theorem 1.1
We are now position to prove our main theorem. We divide the proof into two
cases, (I) n = 2 and (II) n ≥ 3.
Proof of Theorem 1.1 (I)
We first treat with the case where n = 2 and prove that every x is equilibrium.
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0(= 1)
x1
x2
Proof. (i) x1 6= x2
We notice that f1(x) = f2(x) =
1
2
in this case.
(ii) x1 = x2
0(= 1)
x1 = x2
We notice that f1(x) = f2(x) =
1
2
in this case.
It follows that f1(x) = f2(x) =
1
2
for every x. As a result, we showed that
fk(x) ≥ fk(xk → [0, 1]) (k = 1, 2). Forthermore, it holds that |I1| + |I2| ≥ |I1|
and |I1|+ |I2| ≥ |I2|. Therefore, we can prove (1.1).

Proof of Theorem 1.1 (II)
Finally, we are concerned with the case where n ≥ 3.
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Proof. First, we show that (1.1) is a sufficient condition for equilibrium.
We recall that we defined |I¯| = max
l∈{1,2,··· ,n}
|Il|.
We show that fk(x) ≥
1
2
|I¯|.
(i) xk−1 6= xk and xk 6= xk+1
We notice that fk(x) =
1
2
(|Ik−1|+ |Ik|) ≥
1
2
|I¯|.
0(= 1)
xk−1
xk
xk+1
(ii) xk−1 = xk (resp. xk = xk+1)
0(= 1)
xk−2
xk−1 = xk
xk+1
If |Ik−1| = 0, since |Ik−2| + |Ik−1| ≥ |I¯| and |Ik−1| + |Ik| ≥ |I¯|, we have
|Ik−2| = |Ik| = |I¯|. (resp. If |Ik| = 0, since |Ik−1| + |Ik| ≥ |I¯| and
|Ik| + |Ik+1| ≥ |I¯|, we have |Ik−1| = |Ik+1| = |I¯|.) Therefore, we obtain
fk(x) =
1
2 · 2
(|I¯|+ |I¯|) =
1
2
|I¯| in this case.
From (i) and (ii), we conclude that fk(x) ≥
1
2
|I¯|.
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Next, we show that fk(x) ≥ fk(xk → [0, 1]).
(i) xk → (xk−1, xk+1) (1 ≤ k ≤ n)
(a) xk−1 6= xk and xk 6= xk+1
We have fk(xk → (xk−1, xk+1)) = fk(x).
(b) xk−1 = xk or xk = xk+1
We have fk(xk → (xk−1, xk+1)) ≤
1
2
|I¯| ≤ fk(x).
(ii) xk → (xl, xl+1) (xl < xl+1 and l 6= k − 1, k and 1 ≤ l ≤ n)
We have fk(xk → (xl, xl+1)) =
1
2
|Il| ≤
1
2
|I¯| ≤ fk(x).
(iii) xk → {xl} (1 ≤ k ≤ n and 1 ≤ l ≤ n)
(a) l = k
It clearly holds that fk(xk → {xk}) = fk(x).
(b) The case where only vendor k occupies at xk and moves next to xk
0(= 1)
(xk−2)
(xk−3)
xk−1
xk
xk+1
(xk−2)
x
′
k
In this case, we deduce that fk(xk → {xl}) ≤
1
2 · 2
(|I¯ | + 2fk(x)) ≤
1
4
(2fk(x) + 2fk(x)) = fk(x).
(c) The case where more than two vendors occupy at xk and vendor k
moves next to xk, or vendor k moves to a location that is not next to
xk
In this case, we deduce that fk(xk → {xl}) ≤
1
2 · 2
(|I¯ |+ |I¯|) =
1
2
|I¯| ≤
fk(x).
From (i)–(iii), we conclude that fk(x) ≥ fk(xk → [0, 1]). Therefore we have showed
that (1.1) is a sufficient condition for equilibrium.
Next, we show that (1.1) is a necessary condition for equilibrium. Therefore, we
prove that if (1.1) does not hold, then x is not equilibrium. That is, assuming there
exists k such that |Ik|+ |Ik+1| < |I¯|, we prove that x is not equilibrium. Observing
Proposition 2.2, it suffices to consider the case where only one vendor occupies a
location.
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(i) xk 6= xk+1 and xk+1 6= xk+2
We have fk+1(x) =
1
2
(|Ik|+ |Ik+1|) <
1
2
|I¯|. Let (xj , xj+1) be a maximum
open interval such that |I¯| = |(xj , xj+1)|. If xk+1 → (xj , xj+1), we have
fk+1(xk+1 → (xj , xj+1)) =
1
2
|I¯ | > fk+1(x).
Thus x with this case is not equilibrium.
(ii) xk = xk+1 (resp. xk−1 = xk)
Since |Ik|+|Ik+1| < |I¯| and |Ik| = 0, we drive |Ik+1| < |I¯|. Forthermore, we
notice |Ik−1| ≤ |I¯|. Thus we deduce that fk(x) =
1
2 · 2
(|Ik−1| + |Ik+1|) <
1
2 · 2
(|I¯ | + |I¯|) =
1
2
|I¯|. Let (xj , xj+1) be a maximum open interval such
that |I¯| = |(xj , xj+1)|. If xk → (xj , xj+1), we have fk(xk → (xj , xj+1)) =
1
2
|I¯| > fk(x). Thus x is not equilibrium in this case.
From (i)–(ii), we have showed that (1.1) is a necessary condition for equilibrium.
Therefore, we can complete the proof of Theorem 1.1. 
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